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Page 538, Column 1. Replace Paragraph 2 with:
Furthermore, the author consolidated Mazmanian and Sabatier’s variables and simplified their 
language. Mazmanian and Sabatier had multiple variables addressing themes from different 
viewpoints, which made the framework’s structure clunky and repetitive. Their language was 
also unnecessarily complex (DeLeon, 1999). The author merged the actor-related variables 
by themes and substituted terms with those used in contemporary policy studies to facilitate 
viewpoint comparisons, reduce repetition and make the framework more user-friendly.
Page 539, Column 1. Replace Paragraph 2 under ‘Policy targets’ with:
Regarding facility type, policymakers aimed to eradicate ‘black buckets’ – the containers 
used in household pail-based systems, which were the apartheid government’s primary 
means for servicing non-white areas. Considered relics of discriminatory governance (RSA, 
1996b), policymakers centred the FBSan vision and funding on replacing buckets with either a 
ventilated pit latrine (VIP) or an equivalent technology per household.
Page 539, Column 2. Replace Paragraph 1 Line 1 under ‘Actor specification’ with:
National policymakers (DWAF, 2001, 2003) stated that
Page 539, Column 2. Replace paragraph under ‘Technical aspects’ with:
While policymakers envisioned a VIP or its equivalent per household, they did not prescribe 
FBSan technologies or servicing ratios in recognition that policy had to suit a diverse range of 
conditions, and that implementers needed discretion to progressively realise objectives based 
on available resources and local conditions (DWAF, 2003). National policymakers, however, 
noted that municipalities and beneficiaries were to agree on technology, and recommended 
waterborne sewerage for high-density urban areas.
Page 540, Column 1.  Replace Paragraph 1 Lines 1–3 under ‘Clear objectives’ with:
Implementers are often faulted for misinterpreting policy guidance. CoCT (2001) officials, 
however, indicated their understanding
Page 540, Column 2. Replace Paragraph 1, Lines 1–4 under ‘Financial allotment’ with:
Another major policy assumption was that municipalities had sufficient FBSan funds through 
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Policy implementation considerations for basic services:  
A South African urban sanitation case
L Taing1*
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ABSTRACT
The Republic of South Africa formulated numerous progressive laws, regulations and strategies from 1994 to 2008 to support 
the provision of free basic sanitation access to the poor by 2014. The State has yet to achieve this objective in urban areas – 
ostensibly due to the poor municipal execution of national policy. This paper challenges this viewpoint, as it ignores policy 
weaknesses and overlooks the influence of non-municipal actors in service delivery. An assessment of national policy and 
implementation in South Africa’s second largest city (Cape Town) indicated that irreconcilable differences between municipal 
officials, residents and advocates’ interpretations of broadly-framed national policy, as well as policy gaps specific to servicing 
informal settlements and providing shared sanitation, contributed to the municipality’s failure to achieve policy objectives. 
The actors’ differences and policy shortcomings necessitated municipal policy reformulation according to the ‘lived’ and 
‘practical’ realities of servicing informal settlements. The findings suggest a disproportionate focus on turning national policy 
into practice – for this viewpoint misses how local actors’ perspectives and current practices can shape policy. Understanding, 
accepting and addressing the interplay between policymaking and implementation can contribute to more constructive 
means of effectively delivering sanitation in South Africa. 
Keywords: lifeline tariffs, implementation science, public policy and administration, shared sanitation, informal 
settlements, service provision
INTRODUCTION 
Sanitation is commonly considered taboo to discuss in public. 
This private matter, however, was at the centre of a national 
South African debate after newspapers splashed photographs of 
municipality-built toilets without walls across their front pages 
in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The photographs 
upset many people, who were appalled that a brand-new 
football stadium was built with public money while people 
defecated in full view just 65 km away in a low-income Cape 
Town suburb. 
The open-toilet scandal provoked public introspection about 
the urban poor’s inability to defecate with dignity after a quarter 
century of democratic rule. Municipal provision of non-sewered 
container-based toilets in informal settlements especially evoked 
concerns about post-Apartheid progress. Representatives of 
different arms of national government and social advocates 
quoted legislation and policy to fault the municipality for not 
complying with countrywide norms and basic standards (MSTT, 
2012; SAHRC, 2014). Put simply, critics had no doubt that the 
municipality had disregarded national policy. 
The focus on municipal shortcomings reflects the prevailing 
notion of poor policy implementation being the primary reason 
South Africa has thus far failed to achieve its urban sanitation 
objectives. This paper challenges this simple explanation 
because wholly faulting municipal implementation depends 
on the assumption of there being a workable national policy. It 
also ignores how a diverse range of actors and factors can affect 
policy processes.
This paper details how local contestation has influenced 
the design and delivery of sanitation policies and services 
for informal settlements in South Africa’s second-largest 
metropolitan area. After describing the methods and analytical 
framing (implementation studies) employed, the paper 
summarises the key principles underpinning South Africa’s 
sanitation policy. It thereafter discusses policy implementation 
over a 14-year period in the City of Cape Town (CoCT) 
Municipality. Based on the way people create policy, deliver 
services, and use toilets, it suggests that policy gaps and rival 
understandings of ambiguous policy language necessitated the 
reformulation of national policy according to local contexts. 
The author hence argues that there is a disproportionate focus 
on turning national policy into practice –for this viewpoint 
misses how local contexts can reshape and redefine policy. This 
case illustrates the need to consider implementation factors to 
realise servicing policy objectives.  
METHODS 
This paper is based on doctoral research that built on two Water 
Research Commission (WRC) studies on sanitation for South 
African informal settlements (Taing et al., 2013, 2014). The 
studies considered different stages of policy implementation 
and service provision – ranging from infrastructure planning 
to maintenance – from the viewpoints of municipal officials 
and residents. To consider whether policy had changed during 
implementation following the conclusion of the studies, the 
author additionally compared policy implementation data to 
national sanitation guidance for informal settlements. The next 
sections detail the means of data collection and analysis. 
Data collection
The author collected 3 types of data (secondary, interview 
and observational) following a mixed method for multiphase 
longitudinal studies. Secondary data was based on a desktop 
review of available documents concerning the design, 
implementation and regulation of sanitation for the urban poor 
from 1994 to 2014 (e.g., policies, project files, media statements, 
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print articles and literature). The author interviewed 4 national 
policymakers in April 2015, and conducted semi-structured 
interviews with residents, municipal officials, activists and 
academics involved in policy design, implementation and 
advocacy from March 2010 to August 2013. 
The author also collected data as a participant observer in 
three CoCT offices for 9 months from March 2010 to September 
2012, and at an ablution block in BM Section informal settlement 
from November 2012 to August 2013. At CoCT, she joined 
municipal officials as an intern in the informal settlement 
units of the Water and Sanitation Department and Human 
Settlements (then Housing) Directorate. This entailed shadowing 
officials when they attended meetings and visiting sites to install 
or manage toilets and supporting inter-departmental sanitation 
projects. At BM’s ablution block, she assisted janitors while 
observing how users interacted with the facilities before and after 
cleaning. She lastly observed and interacted with janitors of flush 
toilets interspersed throughout the settlement. 
The University of Cape Town (UCT) conferred ethical 
approval, and CoCT officials and community leadership 
granted permission to undertake research in their areas of 
jurisdiction. Aside from policymakers with public profiles, 
the author does not use personal identifiers in order to protect 
participants’ anonymity. 
Data analysis
The paper’s focus is to unpack a little-explored topic in South 
Africa: considerations of national informal settlements 
sanitation policy from an implementation perspective. It does 
not detail specific informal settlement case data, as this has 
been summarised in two WRC reports and two other journal 
publications (Taing, 2017a, 2017b). The paper instead discusses key 
research findings in its application of an implementation studies 
analytical framework, which complements and challenges the 
policy cycle framing dominant in South African policymaking. 
Policy cycle framing
Lasswell’s (1956) policy cycle framework characterises 
policymaking as 5 sequential stages: agenda setting, policy 
formulation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation 
stages. This framing has been so popular in policy studies that 
Hill and Hupe (2010) described it as the ‘textbook approach’. 
The notion of policy occurring in stages is ingrained in 
South African government structures and processes (DPLG, 
2007; RSA, 1998, 2000). Influential sanitation figures adopting 
this linear view of policymaking tend to attribute policy failure 
to implementers who supposedly are either non-compliant 
with or have maladministered and misinterpreted national 
legislation and policy (DHS, 2012; DWA, 2013; DWAF, 2004; 
Mjoli et al., 2009; MSTT, 2012; SAHRC, 2014; SJC, 2013). South 
Africa’s policy cycle preoccupation has resulted in very little 
deliberation of possible shortcomings in policy.
Critics of the policy cycle, however, note that the framework 
adopts a top-down perspective in assuming that good policies 
often fail due to bad implementation and oversimplifies 
policymaking (Hill and Hupe, 2010). Additionally, the policy 
cycle assumes that policymaking is sequential, which overlooks 
potential disruption and feedback that can change policy 
processes. Sabatier (2007), for example, noted that it neglects 
how policies can change during implementation and following 
evaluation. The next section details an analytical framing that 
counters this predominant framework.
Policy implementation framing
Policy implementation studies evolved to address the cycle 
framework’s shortcomings. Policy implementation framing 
focuses on if and how an objective is realised. Its key 
assumptions are that: (i) policies are workable; (ii) analysis 
considers how change occurs and how it is induced; (iii) 
implementation is complicated due to the diverse range of 
variables effecting sometimes unpredictable changes; and 
(iv) implementation dominates outcomes, for implementers 
ultimately are responsible for balancing political pressure and 
sourcing resources to realise change. 
This paper’s analysis uses a policy implementation framing 
to complement and challenge South Africa’s prevailing policy 
cycle rationale. Specifically, an adaptation of Mazmanian 
and Sabatier’s (1989) 21-variable framework for analysing 
technologically oriented policy was applied (Fig. 1). Unlike 
other implementation theorists, Mazmanian and Sabatier 
included technical variables in their framework, which is 
significant for this research because sanitation delivery involves 
technological systems and knowledge. 
The author, however, restructured and re-categorised 
Mazmanian and Sabatier’s framework for analysis because of 
her intent to assess the interplay between actors’ perspectives 
and sanitation outcomes rather than influence policy processes. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier designed their framework to help 
elected officials shape implementation. Sabatier (1986) admitted 
that this intent indicated they had a legalistic and top-down 
bias. Given that the author intended to understand factors and 
interactions between variables (Hill and Hupe, 2010: 49) rather 
than control processes, the author restructured the framework 
Figure 1. Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1989, p. 22) framework
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and regrouped variables according to a pared understanding of 
policy processes (i.e. targeting; policy-implementation process; 
and evaluation). 
Furthermore, the author consolidated Mazmanian and 
Sabatier’s variables and simplified their language. Mazmanian 
and Sabatier had multiple variables addressing themes 
from different viewpoints, which made the framework’s 
structure clunky and repetitive. Their language was also 
unnecessarily complex (DeLeon, 1999) they note that in 
many ways, the implementation and evaluation stages are 
one and the same (although necessarily separated for reasons 
of functional effectiveness. The author merged the actor-
related variables by themes and substituted terms with those 
used in contemporary policy studies to facilitate viewpoint 
comparisons, reduce repetition and make the framework 
more user-friendly.
Lastly, the author expanded the actor categories, as 
Mazmanian and Sabatier’s three perspectives (policymaker, 
implementer and target group) excluded various arms of 
government and external actors. A generic actor list based 
on purpose – i.e., policymaker (agenda-setter, formulator 
or decision-maker); implementer; beneficiary (recipient) or 
evaluator and regulator (enforcer) – was devised. The adapted 
analytical framework is depicted in Fig. 2. 
What follows is an application of the adapted framework that 
firstly summarises the development of South Africa’s sanitation 
policy from 1994. The paper then presents data by linking 
policy to practice in detailing CoCT’s informal settlement 
programming from 2001 to 2014. The research findings are 
lastly discussed in the evaluation section, which outlines said 
municipality’s progress after two decades of democracy. 
South African sanitation policy 
South Africa’s government disseminated numerous sanitation-
relevant laws, strategies and regulations from 1994 to 2008 
(DWAF, 1994, 2001, 2003, 2008; RSA, 1994, 1996a, 1997). 
A common objective underpinning national policy was the 
need to progressively improve conditions of households that 
had been disadvantaged by colonial and apartheid policies. 
Democratic policymakers thus embedded the right to live in 
an environment that did not harm one’s health or well-being, 
as well as rights to water and having one’s dignity respected 
and protected, in the Constitution (RSA, 1996a). These rights 
collectively are understood as the right to basic sanitation 
access, which subsequent legislation explicitly guaranteed 
(RSA, 1997). 
Initially, policymakers endeavoured to realise this objective 
through housing provision: by 2000, one million houses 
had been built (Huchzermeyer, 2001). National government 
moreover installed new rural bulk water infrastructure, and 
subsidised low-income households’ recurrent costs. Despite 
this infrastructure drive, 1 in 7 households lacked toilet 
access at the turn of the century (Stats SA, 2001). Available 
data indicated to policymakers that extreme poverty 
significantly constrained access in spite of municipalities 
offering even highly-subsidised tariffs (Kasrils, 2001; Muller, 
2008). This analysis triggered the policy decision to shift 
from an economically-driven policy (centred on consumer 
cost recovery), to a lifeline tariff social policy in which the 
government fully-subsidised basic water and sanitation services 
for the poor. This policy decision, coupled with local election 
campaign promises (Mosdell, 2006), culminated in the national 
government’s broadened pledge of providing poor households 
with a basic package of limited water, sanitation, refuse removal 
and electricity services at no cost in January 2001. 
While Free Basic Services (FBS) conflicts with the payment-
for-services rationale, South Africans have come to regard it as 
a necessary equity instrument. Policymakers had not intended 
to foster sentiments of entitlement or dependability, as they 
highlighted that the ‘right comes with a responsibility—not to 
abuse the right to free basic services and to pay for services where 
these are provided over and above a basic service’ (DWAF, 2003 
p. ii). Such language is reminiscent of the democracy’s preceding 
self-help policy, in which indigents were to progressively improve 
living conditions by joining capital subsidies with their own 
resources (DWAF, 1994; Wilkinson, 1998).  
The free water and sanitation components went into effect 
in June 2001 (Muller, 2008). Considering best urban practices 
across the country, national policymakers zeroed in on 
Durban’s 1996 Free Basic Water (FBW) cross-subsidy, which 
Kasrils (2001 p. 53) noted had demonstrated that it was feasible 
to have consumers in formal areas fully subsidise the urban 
poor’s consumption. Encouraged by Durban’s success, national 
policymakers concluded that municipalities could offset their 
FBS costs with revenue. The poor hence were to equitably 
benefit from this unprecedented servicing policy, regardless of 
where they lived.  
Notably, while Durban’s FBW cross-subsidy informed 
water policy design, policymakers did not have a comparable 
policy example for the conceptualisation of Free Basic 
Sanitation (FBSan). Additionally, policymakers did not 
acknowledge how the government’s then position of eradicating 
informal settlements (in 2000/01) affected implementation. 
(National housing policymakers later recognised the need 
and opportunities for informal settlement upgrading in 2004 
Figure 2. Adapted analytical framework 
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(DoH, 2004)). The significance of these points is revisited in the 
paper’s discussion section. 
After a decade of policymaking, national policymakers 
stated from thenceforward they would support and regulate 
services implemented by newly-established municipalities, 
which were supposedly ready to ‘assume full responsibility’ for 
service delivery in the democracy’s second decade:
We are now entering another important phase in the long 
process of building local democracy. We have established 
our new municipalities. Now we have to make sure they 
do their job of providing services to our people, efficiently, 
effectively, and affordably (DWAF, 2003 p. 2).
Using the adapted framework, the next section first outlines 
the FBSan policy targets, actors and technology considerations 
and assumptions for urban contexts as per secondary 
documents before presenting policy-implementation process 
data and analysing whether the objectives, financial resources, 
implementers’ capability, decision-making, political support 
and broader situational influences contributed to policy failure. 
The discussion section then closes with an evaluation of 
whether municipal implementation is wholly at fault for failure.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Policy
Policy targets
The FBSan objective was to achieve universal free basic 
sanitation access by 2010 (DWAF, 2003). The target date was 
later extended when it was evident that South Africa would 
miss it (DWA, 2012). The new target aligned sanitation 
timelines with the then informal settlement eradication aim. 
National policymakers indicated that universal access meant 
having a sanitation facility in every household and defined 
basic sanitation as either a physical structure or service package 
(see Fig. 3).
Regarding facility type, policymakers aimed to eradicate 
‘black buckets’ – the containers used in household pail-based 
systems, which were the apartheid government’s primary 
means for servicing non-white areas. Considered relics of 
discriminatory governance (RSA, 1996b)government must 
create an enabling environment through which all South 
Africans can access services and support in obtaining those 
services, but in the end it is individuals who are responsible 
(RSA, 1996b: 4, policymakers centred the FBSan vision and 
funding on replacing buckets with either a ventilated pit latrine 
(VIP) or an equivalent technology per household.
Actor specification 
National policymakers (DWAF, 2001, 2003)2001c: 4 stated that 
they would be the water and sanitation policymaker and regulator, 
and their respective national or provincial counterparts were 
responsible for administering subsidies, developing hygiene plans, 
assisting with integrated planning and aligning regional policies 
with state-wide standards. The national government would 
subsidise the basic infrastructure and off-site O&M costs for 
indigent households, and base policy progress and performance 
on municipal reporting and verification checks.
FBSan beneficiaries would be involved throughout the 
service chain; and be responsible for on-site O&M and for 
servicing costs above basic levels as consumers. Municipal 
implementers would follow national policies and standards; 
be responsible for off-site O&M; and be held accountable for 
service delivery. The private sector would also contribute 
to design, construction and financing to assist municipal 
provision. Civil society would liaise with beneficiaries; 
assist with project management and monitoring; and hold 
municipalities accountable, when necessary.
Technical aspects 
While policymakers envisioned a VIP or its equivalent 
per household, they did not prescribe FBSan technologies 
or servicing ratios in recognition that policy had to suit a 
diverse range of conditions, and that implementers needed 
discretion to progressively realise objectives based on available 
resources and local conditions (DWAF, 2003)as well as monitor 
municipal compliance with national policy, norms and 
standards (DWAF, 2003: 21. National policymakers, however, 
noted that municipalities and beneficiaries were to agree on 




Causal theory is the means by which objectives are 
achieved (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). The primary 
theory underpinning sanitation policymaking was that the 
government had an adequate policy that established the vision, 
approach and ‘detail of how the policies will be implemented 
in order to achieve the vision and goals’ (DWAF, 2003 p. 3). 
Additionally, policymakers were under the impression that 
enough resources were allocated to provide limited amounts 
Figure 3. Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF, 2003 p. 46) basic sanitation definitions
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of free capital and O&M services to poor households, and that 
municipalities could capably administer policy. 
In terms of decision-making and participatory processes, 
national policy indicated that involved actors would work 
together in a pipeline (i.e. over a series of stages) to improve 
demand-driven sanitation over time (DWAF, 1994). It was 
also assumed that involved actors accepted the state’s self-
help approach and servicing policy. For example, national 
policymakers assumed that municipalities would provide 
FBSan and beneficiaries would undertake on-site tasks. Lastly, 
national policymakers presumed it was technically feasible to 
replace bucket systems.  
FBSan implementation in Cape Town’s informal 
settlements has revealed fundamental problems with the causal 
theories underpinning national policy. The next sections 
present and discuss data that challenges the causal assumptions 
underpinning FBSan. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) 
postulated that many policy failures are rooted in unsound 
causal theories. In Cape Town, flawed assumptions about policy 
objectives, resources, capacity, support and technical feasibility 
affected municipal implementation and ultimately contributed 
to policy failure.  
Clear objectives
Implementers are often faulted for misinterpreting policy 
guidance. CoCT (2001)or contained the solid contents on-site 
in tanks (20 officials, however, indicated their understanding 
of legislation and regulations by utilising the basic sanitation 
definition in planning, and acknowledging their responsibility 
for providing access as per their financial, environmental and 
legal situation. Recognising that waterborne services were 
costly and often infeasible and/or illegal to install in densely-
structured settlements situated on occupied land, officials 
gave residents the following options: either household VIP, 
a supposedly ‘improved’ private household black bucket, 
or communal access to container-based alternatives at 
approximately 1 toilet per 5 households. 
As per policy, CoCT (2010 p. 2) intended for beneficiaries 
to keep their toilets ‘clean and hygienic’ as part of a self-help 
scheme that entailed community management of their ‘own’ 
facilities. Officials, however, encountered marked dissent with 
FBSan implementation –namely due to contestation over what 
access meant, what was a suitable VIP equivalent and what 
was to be provided for free. With regards to the access target 
of a household facility, municipal officials interpreted this as 
having a toilet near one’s home. In contrast, residents and their 
advocates understood access as being free and safe to enter, as 
well as functional for use. 
There similarly were distinct interpretations of what an 
acceptable equivalent technology was. VIPs could not be rolled-
out across Cape Town’s informal settlements due to limited 
physical space and the inability to build structurally sound pits 
in sandy soils with high water tables. Residents thus could only 
choose between a household black bucket and a communal 
container. The municipality argued that their equivalents 
technically met the FBSan definition, as many households lacked 
any sanitation facilities, which meant that this was a progressive 
improvement upon their current circumstances. The officials 
further argued that national policymakers had not specified a 
minimum technology requirement or servicing ratio.
Many did not agree, however, with this interpretation. In 
2004, national policymakers stated that buckets in any form 
did not meet the FBSan definition and needed to be replaced 
(DWAF, 2004). Policymakers later retracted this policy position 
and accepted the prolonged use of container-based sanitation in 
light of the inability to eradicate the bucket system nationwide 
(DWAF, 2008). But residents rejected what some described as 
‘glorified buckets’, demanding that CoCT provide waterborne 
sanitation instead. Officials attempted to meet these demands 
by introducing sewerage where possible. Most settlements, 
however, could not accommodate conventional sewerage, 
and failed implementation of alternative sewerage – namely, 
a vacuum sewer in 2009 (Taing, 2017a) – left many officials 
reluctant to innovate.
Municipal officials also experienced backlash against 
their administration of the self-help component of the FBSan 
policy. Following policy guidance, officials introduced toilets 
on a communal basis with the expectation that users would 
manage them as a ‘community.’ In other words, municipal 
officials met the FBSan basic facility definition, and made 
behavioural assumptions about how residents collectively 
utilised and maintained toilets. Their expectations contrasted 
with residents’ more common treatment of shared facilities. 
Communal toilets largely operated as freely accessible public 
toilets, and fell into disrepair due to poor management. Many 
residents (as well as advocates) thereafter demanded that the 
municipality provide users with toilet paper and both on- and 
off-site O&M. This suggests residents expected free provision of 
a service, as per the national basic sanitation definitions.
To curb the municipality’s high O&M and replacement 
costs, as well as meet their servicing obligations, CoCT 
commenced a janitorial service for most of its communal 
toilets from 2013. This meant that CoCT went beyond its 
responsibility of providing FBSan facilities to meet residents’ 
demands and its constitutional servicing obligations. It also 
indicates that rather than changing behaviours according to 
policy, municipal officials ultimately implemented a service 
informed by prevailing residential practices.
Contested understandings of access, acceptable technology 
and FBSan are significant to note, as the varied interpretations 
suggest that policy objectives and corresponding directives 
were unclear and that policymakers’ causal theory of having 
established a clear vision, goals and approach was flawed. 
Experience also bears to question whether it is technologically 
possible to improve upon container-based sanitation in 
densely populated settlements, and whether policy actors 
unconditionally supported the government’s self-help and 
community-management approaches.
Financial allotment
Another major policy assumption was that municipalities had 
sufficient FBSan funds through capital subsidies and O&M 
tariffs (DWAF, 2003)as well as monitor municipal compliance 
with national policy, norms and standards (DWAF, 2003: 21. 
Municipal officials said that they funded informal settlement 
infrastructure from local cross-subsidies due to their inability 
to use housing grants in informal areas. Moreover, they 
struggled to fully subsidise O&M given the increasing demands 
of non-paying consumers in burgeoning informal settlements, 
and their having to undertake the unbudgeted items to 
fulfil servicing obligations. Unbudgeted items ranged from 
providing cleaning services to conflict mediation and hiring 
private security during servicing disputes. CoCT (2001 p. 11) 
additionally provided free water and sanitation to all residents 
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Residents and advocates further indicated the need 
for resourcing handwashing and drainage infrastructure; 
electricity within and surrounding facilities; and improved 
systems for solid waste removal. The unforeseen sanitation 
expenses and funding demands for the urban poor seem tied 
to the government’s ambitious informal settlement eradication 
plan, which did not allow for comprehensive long-term 
support; assumptions of sanitation being apolitical; and general 
oversight of administrative costs, which was needed for new 
programming. Learning from the latter, CoCT (2013) officials 
obtained additional funding from national government when 
developing its informal settlement janitorial service. 
Implementation capability
Research indicated that several disabling institutional 
environments affected implementers’ ability to service informal 
settlements. Firstly, policy contradictions complicated service 
provision. Municipalities are constitutionally compelled to 
provide all South Africans with access to services, irrespective 
of land tenancy. CoCT officials hence were obliged to provide 
sanitation access despite the national government’s intention of 
eradicating all informal settlements by 2014. 
A policy vacuum also stunted servicing efforts. There 
was a lack of national guidance for informal settlements 
considering the eradication aim. Additionally, municipal 
officials noted that FBSan seemed conceived for rural settings, 
for the endorsed technology (VIPs) and servicing ratio (a 
toilet per household) was typical of rural homesteads. This 
household focus resulted in a policy vacuum for communal 
services in urban areas.
Local partisan politics also affected municipal officials’ 
capability. Cape Town is situated in the only Democratic 
Alliance (DA) managed province in an African National 
Congress (ANC) dominated government. The DA has been 
the ANC’s official opposition since 1999. It wrested control of 
Cape Town in 2006 – which was then the only metropolitan 
area not governed by the ANC and became the province’s 
ruling party in 2009. Officials, who had trained as engineers, 
construction managers or plumbers, often complained that 
partisan politics in government and communities harmed 
and stalled sanitation delivery. These officials thus said 
sanitation needed to be driven by technical feasibility rather 
than politics, which indicates their perception that sanitation 
servicing should (and can) be apolitical.
Municipal officials said that an ongoing restructuring 
process additionally stymied their efforts. CoCT had aimed 
to restructure its organisation and administrative functions 
as a decentralised but coordinated unicity by January 2003. 
This target, however, was optimistic, as officials said that 
they were ‘fatigued’ from ‘perpetual restructuring’ that 
left the municipality in a transitional state 15 years after its 
establishment, due to executive turnover. 
Municipal officials who tried to develop informal 
settlement projects noted that they were structurally, 
institutionally and personally ill-prepared. Officials said they 
struggled to synchronise service delivery amongst ‘silos’ due 
to similar or overlapping departmental mandates. CoCT’s 
failed vacuum sewer, for example, illustrated how successive 
rounds of municipal restructuring exacerbated extant 
tensions and rivalries between two departments responsible 
for informal settlement sanitation services (Taing, 2017a). 
Officials also said that they could not project necessary 
informal settlement capital, operation and rehabilitation 
costs in advance because the municipality operates from pre-
approved annual budgets. 
Finally, informal settlement sanitation interventions tend 
to contain policy objectives of simultaneously improving 
conditions while creating temporary job opportunities for 
residents. Some officials responsible for sanitation provision 
said they were ill-prepared and technically not responsible 
for formulating development policy and negotiating time-
consuming local politics. This highlights the dilemma of 
holding municipal officials accountable or compelling them 
to undertake responsibilities in multi-objective initiatives that 
some claimed they were unqualified for or did not feel obliged 
to implement.
In brief, there are a range of socio-political, institutional and 
financial constraints that disabled municipal officials’ capability 
to execute policy. These constraints counter the causal theory of 
FBSan being sufficiently funded for implementation, and that 
municipalities could administer policy. The next section further 
elaborates on how decentralisation affected decision-making and 
participatory pipelines. 
Extent of (de)centralisation
National policymakers had devolved decision-making to 
(a) municipal officials, who were to decide on appropriate 
and affordable services; and (b) communities, who would 
later ‘participate in decision-making about what should be 
done and how’ and accept infrastructural responsibility 
(DWAF, 2001 pp. 21, 11). Many community representatives 
and advocates, however, objected to the municipality’s 
prioritisation of itself over residents’ considerations. They 
argued that processes needed to be bottom-up, with decisions 
being made and methods set on a settlement basis. The 
shortcomings of the community-management scheme further 
suggested that residents wanted to be consulted about what 
and how sanitation would be provided, but not necessarily 
accept responsibility. CoCT thus implemented a janitorial 
programme in which residents were contracted as cleaners 
to undertake on-site O&M. This programme indicated 
that decision-making for and responsibilities of informal 
settlement toilets were devolved to the lowest accountable 
level: the municipality.  
Municipal officials’ experience indicated that they 
eventually adapted consultative approaches to satisfy both 
supporters and opponents. While consensus building is 
time-consuming, several officials said it was necessary to 
have the backing of opposing factions because unresolved 
intra-community tension delayed rollouts and resulted in 
poor project outcomes. Despite municipal accommodations, 
critics claimed that officials’ mostly representative-based 
consultation process did not adequately capture the diversity of 
informal settlement perspectives. They thus demanded further 
devolvement to allow input from oft-overlooked beneficiaries. 
Heterogeneous perspectives were also evident within the 
municipality, as discussed next. 
Providing sanitation in a pipeline manner also requires 
overcoming numerous veto (policy disapproval) and clearance 
(implementation endorsement) points because support and 
direction must be obtained from various departments that 
are responsible for aspects of town engineering and informal 
settlement development. Officials said it was challenging to 
obtain support and coordinate these line functions, especially 
when given contradictory instructions and advice.
Municipal officials implied that their elected counterparts 
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or senior managers largely dictated their actions. The author, 
however, observed that officials had discretion over project-
level decisions. They nonetheless tended to defer decision-
making until they received directives or approvals from senior 
management in order to avoid being held personally and hence 
financially accountable for ‘fruitless and wasteful expenditure,’ 
as per the 1999 Public Finance Management Act (National 
Treasury, 2014 p. 1). Considering this, municipal officials 
said compliance with senior management’s (often unwritten) 
directives or prevailing practices were a significant form of 
civil service protection, as informal settlement servicing tended 
not to be covered in policy. The data suggests that while the 
municipality devolved implementation responsibilities to 
various departments, political and executive leadership tended 
to set agendas and methods. 
This indicates that policy actors had conflicting notions of 
the extent that decision-making and participatory processes 
should have been decentralised. While residents and their 
advocates proposed context-specific processes at an informal 
settlement level, CoCT opted to retain authority because they 
were unable to hold residents accountable. Municipal officials 
additionally struggled with the inherent conflict between 
CoCT’s decentralised structure and centralised decision-
making system. These various constraints suggest that the 
causal theory of sanitation actors working together in a pipe-
line manner is difficult, considering competing priorities and 
perspectives. 
Political support
As with many public projects, political support is a key variable 
that affects successful or failed implementation outcomes. 
Amongst public officials, it was clear that national legislative 
and regulatory authority significantly influenced municipal 
design, as municipal officials applied state policy and the 
self-help approach in sanitation programming. Infrastructure 
dysfunction throughout informal settlements, however, 
prompted CoCT to identify a new policy and approach that 
improved service reliability. Municipal officials’ successful 
introduction of a janitorial service with support from national 
policymakers indicates that political support from those with 
legislative, regulatory and financial authority is instrumental 
in transforming services. In contrast, municipal ability to 
disregard highly critical recommendations from the South 
African Human Rights Council (SAHRC, 2014) indicates 
that the public watchdog lacks both legislative and regulatory 
authority to enforce change.
The public also played a significant role in policy change. 
Because of the open toilets scandal, sanitation became 
a regular fixture in South African media, instigating 
public interest and support for universal access. Officials 
subsequently received additional resources to scale-up 
operations (e.g. a janitorial service in 2013). Sanitation being 
at the fore of public consciousness also provoked reform 
and action at a national level, for toilet scandals throughout 
the country prompted restructuring within government 
institutions (DHS, 2010) and the launching of a state-wide 
investigation (MSTT, 2012). These points suggest that public 
support can affect resource allocation, institutional reform 
and government agendas.  
There were several constituency groups at the residential 
level that further demonstrated they had an important 
footprint. FBSan beneficiaries’ actions, for instance, greatly 
affected service provision. Both national and municipal officials 
had initially presumed that all actors accepted the self-help 
policy. The fallibility of the community-managed toilet system, 
however, indicated to the municipality that it was imprudent to 
expect households in sprawling settlements to use and manage 
toilets collectively. The janitorial service suggests that residents’ 
prevailing practice and advocacy motivated municipal policy 
reformulation. 
Municipal officials considered ‘buy-in’ in communities 
critical to achieving success in sanitation projects. 
Representative support amongst community leadership was 
especially significant despite their occasional observances 
of self-enrichment, nepotism and cronyism, as it facilitated 
implementation. Getting paid contributed to the temporarily 
employed workers’ support for janitorial services, though 
some noted their dissatisfaction with not having longer-term 
employment. 
Lastly, as national policymakers had intended, advocacy 
groups held local government accountable. For example, social 
advocates criticised CoCT’s janitorial service operational 
policy, which they said contained ‘permissive language’ 
and no criteria (e.g. timelines or methods) to hold the 
municipality accountable. Advocates, however, had limited 
effect on municipal processes and systems, because CoCT 
either aligned its resources with groups that supported its 
methods, or adopted an adversarial relationship with those 
that publicised dissent.
These impacts indicate a diverse range of viewpoints and 
interests in sanitation servicing that have affected municipal 
implementation. Situational influences next discuss links 
between informal settlement development and faults in the 
technological assumption underpinning the FBSan objective. 
Situational influences
The acceptance of informal settlements being ‘here to stay’ 
was critical in changing anti-servicing municipal attitudes 
and mindsets. The decision to increase sanitation coverage, 
however, was not always welcomed by residents who wanted 
housing or job security. An official, for example, said that, ‘It 
was shit going to the communities, and fiddling with some 
toilets when you knew that wasn’t the problem.’ This highlights 
the difficulty of separating sanitation delivery from the broader 
socio-political context. 
Another significant factor is technological feasibility. To 
date, a technology that improves upon buckets has yet to be 
identified, and the preferred option (conventional sewerage) 
is not always possible to retroactively install. Introducing 
alternative sewerage is logical, but its management necessitates 
additional capacity in an already overstretched administration 
that is reluctant to test new technologies. These problems 
illustrate that while technology choice is important, the 
aforesaid policy-implementation variables that inform 
delivery and management play a far more significant role in 
informal settlements sanitation. The impact of the policy-




Two worldviews underpinned Cape Town’s sanitation 
debate. The first focused on redressing historical wrongs 
according to the lived reality of informal settlement users. 
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Policy beneficiaries, their advocates and the SAHRC adopted 
this bottom-up perspective. Municipal officials argued that 
implementation realities have first to be addressed—especially 
considering their constitutional obligation to realise sanitation 
rights, thus indicating a bottom-up approach starting at 
government’s lowest level. 
Additionally, policy actors’ interaction and subsequent 
disputes exposed clashing understandings of why sanitation 
policy is formulated and how it should be applied. National 
policymakers adopted a pluralistic stance, in which former 
DWAF Director-General Mike Muller (pers. comm., 21 April 
2015) explained aspirational policies needed to be ‘broad 
enough to cover all situations that might occur within it.’ Like 
national policymakers, Cape Town officials also produced 
aspirational policies, though their documents were practically 
written to attain funding for foreseen implementation tasks and 
often based on prevailing practices. Officials also established 
operational policies, though much of this was unwritten, in 
part to flexibly accommodate for unforeseen responsibilities.
Outspoken residents and their advocates, however, tended 
to view policy as being populist, and hence often demanded 
that the government adapt top-down policies and processes to 
accommodate bottom-up perspectives. Social advocates, as well 
as the SAHRC, additionally understood policy as prescribed 
rules that could be used as regulatory tools. The former hence 
preferred precise phrasing to aspirational language, which was 
difficult to enforce. 
In hindsight, the policy actors participated in Cape Town’s 
sanitation policy process in various capacities. As leading 
policymakers and regulators, national policymakers set agendas, 
formulated policy and financed strategies that influenced 
the design of municipal processes and the provision of new 
infrastructure. Their regulatory impact to date, however, has 
been minimal. Due to national policy shortcomings, municipal 
officials developed sanitation policies as per their requirements. 
CoCT thus adopted multiple policy roles – as an agenda-setter, 
formulator, decision-maker, implementer and regulator.
FBSan beneficiaries influenced sanitation provision by 
not fulfilling their intended roles in community-managed 
toilet schemes. They also influentially set agendas and affected 
implementation by communicating dissatisfaction through 
government platforms or protests. Civil society groups also 
were agenda-setters and evaluators in the sanitation debate. 
Their criticisms resulted in adapted participatory processes and 
greater municipal transparency. The policy actor with minimal 
impact, however, was the SAHRC, which lacked legislative or 
regulatory authority over the municipality. The last section 
summarises the policy outcomes and offers suggestions for 
revision based on the findings from the discussion. 
Policy outcomes
In August 2013, national policymakers announced that they 
had to amend unintended policy gaps – such as a disjointed 
economic regulatory framework (DWA, 2013). Helgard Muller 
(pers. comm., 22 April 2015), a former senior policymaker 
in national government, further noted that the Executive 
Cabinet had never formally approved a draft FBS policy that 
specified the manner that services were to be provided and how 
FBSan was thus to be implemented. Part of the reasons for not 
having regulatory functions established after 2 decades was 
the ongoing debate of whether it should be conducted by the 
national policymaker or an independent institution (Camay 
and Gordon, 2005); the ongoing shuffle of sanitation duties 
between 4 national entities from 2008 to 2014; and the need to 
make ‘significant’ legislative amendments before developing 
regulations (DWA, 2013 p. 17).
These points suggest that there were significant 
sanitation-specific regulatory gaps in addition to the informal 
settlement and shared sanitation policy vacuum. CoCT hence 
implemented the FBSan policy with limited direction and 
critical oversight from its national counterparts. 
National policymakers also notably did not provide criteria 
for measuring what are accessible, safe and appropriate basic 
sanitation facilities or shared services. Of course, as Mike Muller 
(pers. comm., 21 April 2015) pointed out, the definition cannot 
comprehensively address every aspect of sanitation delivery. For 
instance, Muller noted that the basic standard ‘doesn’t deal with 
security of using a facility outside a house in the middle of the 
night,’ but ‘if it did, the sanitation policy would morph into a 
security policy.’ He thus posited whether ‘the broad definition is 
adequate’ considering implementation requirements?
Conflicts amongst Cape Town policy actors suggest that 
national policymakers’ blanket definition was inadequate 
for implementation. A review by policymakers previously 
indicated that municipalities across the country struggled 
with ‘vague’ policy language, such as what precisely constitutes 
access (DWA, 2012: 11). Implementation theorist Matland 
(1995) previously noted that vague standards and mandates 
without specific goals and indicators to measure outcomes 
often resulted in general societal norms and values being 
used as policy’s evaluative criteria. Instead of explicit policy 
language and benchmarks, the Cape Town example indicates 
that local actor’s norms and values were important FBSan 
evaluative criteria for informal settlements, as prevailing 
practice ultimately dominated formal policy 
Additionally, CoCT officials could not follow national 
policy as it was designed. The policy based on rural contexts 
proved inappropriate for informal settlements, as natural and 
built environment constraints largely precluded anything but 
shared services. Policy beneficiaries and advocates have largely 
rejected the top-down approach underpinning the decade-long 
municipal implementation of households being responsible 
for community toilets. The municipality consequently shifted 
responsibility for shared toilets from private households to 
public officials. 
Residents’ practices and advocates’ conflicts with municipal 
officials highlighted that the FBSan vision and definition 
was unclear. While the national and municipal governments 
intended to provide free infrastructure to the poor, residents’ 
actions and demands indicate that they expected and desired 
free O&M as well. This suggests that the lack of definition for 
what exactly was ‘free’ complicated provision.
Considering these shortcomings, CoCT municipality 
effectively became the preeminent sanitation policymaker and 
regulator in its jurisdiction and developed a policy that flouted 
a significant aspect of national policy. The municipality’s 
departure from national policy was to accommodate its 
implementation realities with residents’ lived realities. This 
outcome suggests that local actors and factors can and have 
significantly affected the formulation of sanitation policy. 
Policy revision
South Africa has made massive strides in establishing a rights-
based sanitation policy from scratch in its first 20 years of 
rule, but universal access has yet to be achieved. National 
policymakers have recognised that the government requires 
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‘one streamlined’ policy to address implementation and 
regulatory challenges (DWA, 2013 p. 24). The then Minister 
of Water and Sanitation has, moreover, expressed a need to 
revise norms and standards (Mokonyane, 2015). To get closer 
to servicing goals, policy actors should consider using findings 
from implementation research to inform revision. For instance, 
the following recommendations based on the application of an 
implementation studies framework offers practical advice on 
how to revise the sector’s approach, framework and standard 
according to municipal experiences.
Multi-level governance and multidisciplinary approach 
This research indicates the need to incorporate knowledge 
of lived and implementation realities when reformulating 
policy, as the present viewpoint of turning national policy 
into municipal practice ignores the influence and impact 
local actors have in policymaking and service delivery. 
Understanding and addressing the diverse actors involved 
in multi-level governance is necessary to design a workable 
universal access policy for highly contested areas such as 
informal settlements. 
Similar to water resources management (Funke et al., 
2014), professionals with science backgrounds have been tasked 
with tackling South Africa’s sanitation problem. While their 
expertise is needed, they seem reluctant to accept the politics 
inextricably tied to the practical and lived realities of service 
delivery. To claim that sanitation is apolitical ignores reality, 
for it cannot be separated from the politics that often drive 
servicing. Basing provision solely upon technical feasibility 
also resulted in services that beneficiaries and advocates reject 
as being technology-driven, top-down and undemocratic. 
Given that sanitation is a crosscutting concern that a multitude 
of interest groups are concerned with, a multi-disciplinary 
approach is needed whereby actors representing various 
backgrounds and perspectives develop policy together to tackle 
differences in worldview, motives and approaches that have 
emerged in the democracy’s second decade.
Holistic and inclusive sanitation framework 
The findings on implementation highlight Mehta and Mehta’s 
(2013) argument for shifting urban sanitation ‘beyond the 
household level facilities to encompass wider dimensions of 
equity, public health and national environment’ through citywide 
approaches. Such a shift should holistically address sanitation 
by integrating the provision, collection, disposal and reuse of 
all domestic water and waste (human and animal faeces and 
urine, greywater and rubbish) and stormwater. Given South 
Africa’s water security concerns, it is also significant to tie urban 
sanitation planning to water resources and demand management. 
Global sanitation experts have highlighted city-level 
approaches as the best way to achieve inclusive service 
delivery (BMGF et al., 2017). Adopting a holistic and inclusive 
framing is relevant to South African municipalities, as they 
are increasingly tasked with broadening sanitation beyond the 
provision of a toilet. 
Free basic sanitation standard criteria clarification 
South Africa’s sanitation sector focuses on the adoption, 
implantation and enforcement of laws and policies that are 
consistent with national policy. There hence is an expectation 
that implementers and beneficiaries should subscribe and comply 
with policymakers’ rules and methods. This legalistic approach is 
pluralistic and prescriptive and has resulted in little consideration 
of practical guidance for providing or using free services. A former 
municipal manager of Durban’s water services explained, 
What is often overlooked is what does the “right” really 
mean in practical terms—how much, what quality, how 
often, how far, how safe to access? (Neil McLeod, as cited by 
Muller, 2011 p. 7). (Muller, 2011)
Put differently, policy actors need to clarify the criteria of the 
broadly framed FBSan standard, by establishing what precisely 
is to be provided at no cost and offer definitions and means to 
assess what is safe, reliable, private, accessible, sustainable and 
appropriate. National policymakers, for instance, have a free 
water allowance of 6 kL per household, and explicitly defined 
basic water supply as infrastructure that supplies a stipulated 
quantity (25 L per person per day); at a specific distance (200 m 
from a household); and at a particular rate (minimum flow of 
10 L per minute for communal taps) (DWAF, 2003: 46). While 
the sanitation standard need not be quantifiable, there should 
be a means for measuring it for implementation and regulatory 
purposes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
South Africa’s democracy has been lauded worldwide for its 
transformative policies and legal frameworks that have boldly 
redressed historical discrimination. The government has made 
massive strides in establishing a comprehensive sanitation 
policy in its first decade of democratic rule. The ambitious 
objectives, however, have yet to be realised, for many South 
Africans lack access to toilets reserved exclusively for their 
households. The popular response for this failure is to hold 
local government accountable for not following national policy 
and regulations. 
This focus of realising prescriptive rights-based policy 
misses how implementers and beneficiaries’ prevailing 
practices can affect policy realisation and overlooks policy gaps. 
This paper hence puts forward a need to adapt policymaking in 
South Africa to include implementation framing, by accounting 
for contestation in policy processes; reformulating policy to 
reflect lived and implementation realities; and working both 
inside and outside of government to clarify ambiguous policy 
and close regulatory gaps. 
While research is available on FBW, South Africa’s 
FBSan has yet to be critically studied. This paper valuably 
contributes research on this topic. It uses a multivariate 
policy implementation framework to analyse a controversial 
sanitation policy that is regarded as a keystone of progress 
in post-apartheid South Africa. The paper brings a unique 
view to discussions, as it contrasts the dominant framing of 
transforming national policy into local practice. Accepting 
that policy processes do not unfold in sequential stages and 
that policy is not just made by national policymakers is critical 
to reformulate aspirational policies according to micro-level 
needs, politics and actions.
Similarly, there is a legalistic sector bias for achieving 
water and sanitation rights at a global scale. As Singh (2013) 
indicated, research and interventions addressing the interface 
of local implementation and socio-cultural contexts can 
advance discussions beyond this narrow purview. Further 
research on and reflections of systemic conditions are needed, 
as Castro and Heller (2012) stated, to improve decision-making, 
organisation, financing and governance concerning the 
planning and management of basic services. 
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